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and : Does Wrong Equal Wrong?

FOREIGN FISHING PIRACY VS. SOMALIA PIRACY – DOES WRONG
EQUAL WRONG?
Leticia M. Diaz and Barry Hart Dubner*
This article is a sequel (and in some ways, a “prequel”) to our last article, On
the Evolution of the Law of International Sea Piracy.1 That piece, prepared in
April 2009, attempted to illustrate the enormous problem of sea piracy off of Somalia. It was updated through October 2009 and published in December 2009.
We were invited to, and participated in, a conference sponsored by the Harvard
Kennedy Center. Professor Robert Rotberg, Director of the Intrastate Conflict program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs,2 was the coordinator for two days of intensive presentations and discussions (10-12 December, 2009). As a result of the conference, Harvard published a
policy statement on how to combat sea piracy, with an emphasis on Somalia.3 In
addition to your authors, the twenty-two conference panelists included individuals
from different think tanks, the intelligence community, the U.S. State Department,
and the military, including one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After each session’s
panelists presented individually, we launched into discussions. Prior to the conference, each panelist submitted a synopsis, which served to focus our discussions.
Your authors discussed jurisdiction, sovereignty, the environment and human
refugees who may be affected by sea piracy. We also learned quite a bit of new
information. For example, one of the gentlemen present was from an African
country. He provided a viewpoint that was both interesting and disturbing, and
took us back to Somalia and a way of life that existed prior to the recent surge of
piracy in that region. We left the conference inspired to write this article which
sets forth a view of why Somali piracy started and some of the problems created by
these illegal acts. Harvard’s policy statement will speaks for itself.

________________________

*
Leticia M. Diaz, Professor of Law, Dean, Barry University School of Law; J.D., Rutgers University
School of Law, Newark (1994); Ph.D. (Organic Chemistry), Rutgers University, Newark (1988). Barry Hart
Dubner, Professor of Law, Barry University, Andreas School of Law, Orlando, Florida; J.D., New York Law
School; LL.M., University of Miami, School of Law; LL.M., New York University School of Law; J.S.D., New
York University School of Law. The authors would like to thank and acknowledge their research assistant, Karen
Greene, whose patience in editing, preparing, and organizing the footnotes proved invaluable.
1.
Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, On the Evolution of the Law of International Sea Piracy: How
Property Trumped Human Rights, the Environment and the Sovereign Rights of States in the Areas of the Creation
and Enforcement of Jurisdiction, 13 BARRY L. REV. 175 (2009).
2.
See
Belfer
Center
Home,
Programs/Projects,
Intrastate
Conflict
Program,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/52/intrastate_conflict_program.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2010).
3.
Robert I. Rotberg, World Peace Foundation, COMBATING MARITIME PIRACY: A POLICY BRIEF WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
ACTION
(2010),
available
at
http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org/WPF_Piracy_PolicyBrief_11.pdf.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The conference at the Harvard Kennedy School, concerning the topic of controlling maritime piracy, was the first such meeting that Harvard University has
hosted since the early 1930s. The agenda covered a range of topics, mostly related
to piracy off the coast of Somalia. The subjects included, inter alia: the intensity,
spread, and economics of maritime piracy globally; the exploration of relevant legal issues, including sovereignty and jurisdiction; preventing piracy at sea; preventing piracy from land; national and regional policies and strategies of the United
States and the European Union. A policy statement was issued after this intense,
three-day conference. Your authors left the conference convinced that it was important to discuss certain topics that were not covered in their previous article.
The December 2009 conference was not intended to mirror the extensive time
that Professor Jonathan Bingham, Harvard University, spent with a group of persons in creating the 1932 Draft Convention on Piracy, commonly called the “Harvard Draft.”4 However, in order to understand more fully the topics discussed at
the 2009 Harvard conference, it is first necessary to backtrack and look at what the
initial Harvard Draft accomplished back in 1932.
As was stated in our prior article, the Harvard Draft of 1932 was prepared for
the purposes of “expediency.”5 The study itself was extremely comprehensive and
has been used and cited in many different texts. In addition, most of the articles
therein were set forth in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas6 and the
1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)7 as articles on piracy.
The main question at the original Harvard study considered “what initial significance does piracy have in the law of nations?”8 In contrast, the more limited subject discussed at the latest Harvard conference concerned ways to combat piracy,
the significance being one of commercial necessity.
The 1932 Harvard Draft, later adopted by the two conventions aforementioned,
related to piracy on the high seas only.9 Because the crime of piracy interfered
with international shipping on the high seas, it was thought that if the acts of piracy
occurred in territorial or internal waters of the coastal-State, the coastal-State
________________________

4.
Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, with Comment, 26 AM. J. INT’L L.
SUPP. 739 (1932) [hereinafter “Harvard Draft”].
5.
Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 192; Barry Hart Dubner, Human Rights and Environmental Disaster –
Two Problems that Defy the “Norms” of the International Law of Sea Piracy, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1,
11-12 (1997)..
6.
Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 2958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1962), 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention].
7.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter 1982 Convention],
available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
8.
Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 193; Dubner, supra note 5, at 16; Harvard Draft, supra note 4, at 749.
9.
According to UNCLOS, “[p]iracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence
or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction
of any State. . .” 1982 Convention, Art. 101, supra note 7. The 1958 Geneva Convention includes identical language. See Geneva Convention, Art. 15, supra note 6.
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could, and would want to, resolve the situation by prescribing and enforcing its
own municipal legislation on sea piracy.10 In the Harvard Draft there was disagreement over whether or not piracy was “an international crime.”11 The question
at that time was “how would we treat the problem of piracy today in the light of the
possibility of an international agreement for suppression?”12 At that time, there
was a “modern orthodox view” that the law of nations is a law of States only.13
Since there was no “super-government and no international tribunal to administer
international civil or criminal justice against private persons,” and since there was
“no provision in the law of many States punishing foreigners which political offense was committed outside the State’s ordinary jurisdiction, it cannot truly be
said that piracy are crimes or are offenses by the law of nations in a sense which a
strict technical interpretation look at those terms.”14
The only “norm” that was demonstrated by the Harvard Draft was that a “diversity of opinion” existed in 1932 that was “especially remarkable with respect to
the following fundamental matters”:
(1) The definition of piracy in the sense of the law of the nations.
(2) The meaning and justification of the traditional assertions that
piracy is an offence or crime against law of nations.
(3) The common jurisdiction of all states to prosecute and punish
pirates.15
The Harvard Draft explained that there was the “modern orthodox” view as
well as other views on the “nature and scope of the law of nations.”16 The orthodox view provided that:
The law of nations is a law between states only, and limits the respective jurisdictions. Private individuals are not legal persons
under the law of nations. The rights, duties, privileges and powers
which it defines are only those of states. There is no legal universal society of private persons regulated by international law.17
Under the orthodox view, then:
Pirates are not criminals by the law of nations, since there is no international agency to capture them and no international tribunal to
________________________
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 193; Dubner, supra note 5, at 17.
Id.
Harvard Draft, supra note 4, at 753; Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 193; Dubner, supra note 5, at 17.
Harvard Draft, supra note 4, at 760; Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 193; Dubner, supra note 5, at 17.
Harvard Draft, supra note 4, at 756; Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 193; Dubner, supra note 5, at 17.
Harvard Draft, supra note 4, at 749.
Id. at 754.
Id.
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punish them and no provision in the laws of many states for punishing foreigners whose piratical offence was committed outside
the state’s ordinary jurisdiction [therefore,] it cannot be truly said
that piracy is a crime or an offence by the law of nation in a sense
which a strict technical interpretation would give those terms.18
To the contrary, those with “unorthodox” views would conclude that:
The law of nations is like municipal law except that it has no international governmental agencies to enforce it. These jurists conceive of the civilized states of the world as members of a veritable
legal community, all subject to the authority of a definite legal order. Some speak of a citizenship of private individuals in this
world community, and of international law as the law of a supersociety. Some maintain that there are international law crimes, although because the international community is backward in organization, there are no agencies except those of individual states to
punish offenders. Some of these jurists argue that there should be
an international tribunal of justice before which private individuals
might prosecute their claims against states and private individuals
might be prosecuted for crimes against the international community. They would classify piracy as such a crime. Indeed one jurist
whose fundamental views on international law are otherwise orthodox, M. Pella of Romania, considers piracy a prototype to
which should be assimilated in time all crimes universally recognized as offenses against society. The perpetrators of such crimes,
he says, should be punished by any state which seizes them, pending the establishment of an international court of criminal justice.19
The upshot of all this is that by 1932:
[p]iracy lost its great importance in the law of nations before the
modern principles of finely discriminated state jurisdictions and…
freedom of the seas became thoroughly established. Indeed, the
former prevalence of piracy may be assigned as a principal cause
of the old reluctance of states to accept the doctrine of the freedom
of the seas. Formerly naval powers fought pirates with little regard
for the sort of problems which would trouble our modern world of
intense commerce and strongly asserted national claims of numerous states, and with an acquiescence of the commercial interests

________________________
18.
19.

Id. at 756.
Id. at 752.
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which needed protection against those dangerous common enemies
. . .20
For example, during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), Japanese pirates plundered
the seacoasts of eastern Asia, ranging from Korea to Indochina.21 According to
certain sources, as early as 1223 Japanese pirates who raided the Korean coast were
the first to be called Wo-k’ou, and such Japanese pirates were active along Asian
coasts until the last quarter of the sixteenth century.22 As we shall see shortly when
discussing the problems in Somalia, there were socio-political factors which caused
the rise and spread of piracy in parts of China and related areas.23 One of these was
the “growing influence of regionalism.”24 When the central government of China
was effective, it was difficult for the smuggling-piratical activities to exist for a
long time.25 But the Chi-Ching period was a far cry from other periods when the
ruler was an autocrat and his influence could reach every nook and corner of the
empire.26 In fact, it has been said that the “budding growth of regionalism must
have indulged the spread of smuggling before deteriorating into piracy.”27 Another
factor, which in the beginning was said to encourage piracy, was the terribly dilapidated state of coastal defense.28 “After a long period of peace, not only the original system of coastal defense had deteriorated, but the people had also grown timid
and averse to the art of war.”29
The persons who prepared the Harvard Draft believed that the type of piracy
seen in Errol Flynn’s movies (and possibly off the coast of China) had died years
before the preparation of the 1932 Draft. An illustration of such European piracy is
described in a book about William Dampier, a noted author and naturalist as well
as a pirate during the late 1600s to the early 1700s.30 He described his companions
as “privateers”;31 they were not. Privateers at the time were “legalized” maritime
raiders given official letters of marque in war times by governments to attack enemy shipping, usually in return for a cut of the proceeds, which also had to be
shared with the ship’s owners.32 The men to whom Dampier referred were actually
“buccaneers” – adventurers whose activities often had no legal sanction and
crossed the boundary into out-and-out piracy, when all ships were fair game and
the loot had to be shared with no one.33 The term “buccaneer” is derived from a
________________________

20.
Id. at 764-65.
21.
KWAN-WAI SO, JAPANESE PIRACY IN MING CHINA DURING THE 16TH CENTURY 1 (Michigan State
University Press 1975).
22.
Id.
23.
Id. at 134.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 134-35.
27.
Id. at 135.
28.
KWAN-WAI SO, supra note 21, at 135.
29.
Id.
30.
Diana Preston & Michael Preston, A PIRATE OF EXQUISITE MIND: EXPLORER, NATURALIST, AND
BUCCANEER: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM DAMPIER (Walker & Company 2004).
31.
Id. at 44.
32.
Id. at 44-45.
33.
Id. at 45.
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French word “boucanier,” which means people who smoked or cured strips of meat
on a frame of green sticks, or “boucan,” over a slow fire fed by animal bones and
pieces of hide.34 Much of the piracy that occurs today off of the coast of Somalia
is driven for financial gain35 and it is interesting to note, as we will see, if one substituted for the word “government” in the preceding definition of privateers, the
word “mafia” or “financiers” or “terrorists” or “governmental assistants” or similar
equivalents, one could see that the Somali pirates are actually financed, in part, by
governmental clan people.
Another similarity between “older” and current Somali pirates, as we will see,
is that the Somalis claim their fishing area was destroyed by European and Asian
fishing vessels and the environment was equally decimated by dumping.36 In the
late 1600s, the:
Pirate and buccaneer ships also held another ceremony unique to
themselves: the gallows humor of the mock trial. With the aid of
a few props, such as a mop for the judge’s wig and a tarpaulin for
his robe, the sailors would expiate their forebodings by taking
turns playing the judge, lawyer, or prisoner. Sometimes the
charges were ludicrous, and the humor was broad. At other times,
the sailors’ pleas reflected what they might have said in reality before a stern-faced judge. Some swore they ‘came from the sea’
and so recognized no country and no authority. Some claimed to
be egalitarian ‘Robin Hood’s men,’ righting social wrong, others
that they were expansionist imperialists like Alexander the Great
and that the only differences between them was the extent of their
conquests, not their legitimacy.37
It is apparent that while the types of piracy that the Harvard Draft referred to
were no longer in existence, the customs and mores of classical pirates remain until
today. Piracy, today, comes in more shapes and forms than the usual “historical”
classical types of piracy. Let us examine the reasons given by the Somalis for their
despicable actions. The “defense” of “justification” was raised at the 2009 Harvard
conference.
II. DEFENSE OF THE SOMALIA PIRATES – SEA PIRACY VS. FISHING PIRACY
One of the most important items discussed at the 2009 Harvard conference was
the devastating effect that the pirate fishing and the dumping of hazardous waste
________________________

34.
Id. at 45 n.†.
35.
Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at A6,
A10.
36.
Michael Vazquez, Why We Don’t Condemn Our Pirates, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 12, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-vazquez/on-pirates_b_186015.html; Joann Hari, You are Being Lied to
about Pirates, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 4, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johann-hari/you-are-beinglied-to-abo_b_155147.html.
37.
Preston & Preston, supra note 30, at 141.
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has had on Somalia. Before discussing this matter, it is necessary to give a little
historical perspective as to what is going on now in Somalia. The decline of the
Somali fishery sector can be traced to the 1991 Somali Civil War, as most Somali
fisheries were shut down during that period.38
Thereafter, very sophisticated factory-style fishing vessels, designed for deep
ocean fishing and coming from distant countries (countries often thousands of
miles away from Somalia) started to overexploit the “rich, uncontrolled, and unprotected Somali seas.”39 These fleets search Somali waters for valuable catches, including rock lobster and high value pelagic fish.40 International demand for marine
products has been increasing, but the Asian seas are overfished and the EU closed
much of its fishing waters for up to 15 years in order to allow for fish regeneration.41 As a result, for the last nineteen years, “fishing piracy” has consisted of
criminal poaching and wanton destruction of the Somali marine waters.42 This
illegal fishing is economically and environmentally damaging to Somalia.43 So,
from the Somali point of view, while the U.N. was passing resolutions, and NATO
and the E.E.U. were issuing decrees and orders to invade Somali seas to attack
pirates, why did the concerned states not protect the Somali marine resources from
violations in the same waters?44 From this viewpoint, the U.N., NATO forces, the
European Union, Russia, Japan, India, Egypt, Yemen, and others are only concentrating on the safety of merchant ships, while at the same time covering up and
protecting their own illegal fishing activities.45
Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing46 presents a serious problem
globally, in that it does not respect the national boundaries of sovereigns; it puts an
________________________

38.
Mohamed Abshir Waldo, Somali piracy, the other side of the coin, AFRICAN PROSPECT, Oct. 2009, at 8
[hereinafter Waldo, Somali piracy] (quoting the High Seas Task Force), available at
http://www.exacteditions.com/exact/browse/576/929/5847/3/8?dps=.
39.
Id.; Hari, supra note 36.
40.
Waldo, Somali piracy, supra note 38, at 9.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 10-11.
44.
Id. at 11.
45.
Id.
46.
The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing (IPOA-IUU) defines IUU as follows:
3.1 Illegal fishing refers to activities:
3.1.1 conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State,
without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations;
3.1.2 conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted by that organization and by which the States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or
3.1.3 in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken
by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management organization.
3.2 Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.2.1 which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or
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unsustainable pressure on stocks among marine life and habitats; and, it undermines labor standards and distorts markets.47 IUU fishing is detrimental to the
wider marine ecosystem because it ignores the rules that are designed to protect the
marine environment, including restrictions on the harvest of juveniles, closing
spawning grounds, and demanding gear modifications designed to minimize bycatch of non-target species.48 IUU fishing robs the local people of an invaluable
protein source; ruins the livelihoods of almost all legitimate fishermen; causes
trawlers to come into inshore areas reserved for artisanal fishing, resulting in collisions with fishing boats, destruction of fishing gear, and deaths of fishermen.49
This unlawful worldwide value of IUU catches is between USD 4 billion and
USD 9 billion.50 If this were not bad enough, there is also a serious global “fishcatch laundering” problem.51 Fish-catch laundering can occur through mother-ship
factories that use uncontrolled transhipment and resupply lines at sea.52 Operations
on this scale can keep their vessels at sea for months, refueling, resupplying and
rotating their crews.53 Their fishing vessels never have to enter port because they
transfer their catches onto transport ships.54 Fish-catch laundering generates hundreds of millions of dollars in the black market, and they use sea ports in the Seychelles, Mauritius, and the Maldives in order to launder Somali fish.55 So, historically, just before the collapse of the Somali regime in 1991, it was estimated that at
least 200,000 tonnes of fish per year could be harvested sustainably by both artisanal and industrial fisheries.56 The international fishing racket loots this area to

3.2.2 undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organization which have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the
reporting procedures of that organization.
3.3 Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.3.1 in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that
are conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party
to that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that organization; or
3.3.2 in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or
management measures and where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under international law.
Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, ¶¶ 3.1-3.32, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/y1224e/y1224e00.pdf.
47.
HIGH SEAS TASK FORCE, CLOSING THE NET: STOPPING ILLEGAL FISHING ON THE HIGH SEAS 1 (2006),
http://www.high-seas.org, then click on documents.
48.
Waldo, Somali Piracy, supra note 38, at 8.
49.
Id.
50.
HIGH SEAS TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 1.
51.
Waldo, Somali Piracy, supra note 38, at 8. Fish-catch laundering involves mixing illegally caught fish
with legally caught fish prior to bringing the catch into port for sale. Id. at 8-9.
52.
Id. at 8.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 9.
56.
Id.
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the point that one scientist has put the figure of illegal taking at 300,000 tonnes of
fish per year.57
There were also severe droughts in Somalia in 1974 and 1986, forcing many
groups to be resettled along villages on the long, 33,000 kilometer Somali coast.58
These groups developed into large fishing communities whose livelihoods depended mainly on inshore fishing.59 But when the Siad Barre Regime fell in 1991,
the coast guard and naval services of Somalia ceased to exist.60
Deadly events followed the collapse of the Somali government. “Local fishermen documented cases of [foreign] trawlers pouring boiling water on them in
their canoes, their nets cut or destroyed, smaller boats crushed, killing all the occupants, and other abuses suffered as they tried to protect their national fishing
turf.”61 The escalation and cycle of war in Somalia has been going on from 1991 to
the present. According to the High Seas Task Force (HSTF) there were over 800
IUU vessels in Somali waters at one time during 2005 because Somalia simply
could not patrol and control its own waters and fishing grounds.62 The fishpoachers are estimated to take out more than USD $450 million in fish value from
Somalia annually.63 They do not compensate the local fishermen, nor do they pay
taxes, or any royalties.64 They do not care about management, conservation, or
environmental regulations which are norms that are associated with regulated fishing.65
These IUU fishing trawlers are mostly owned by EU and Asian fishing companies, including: Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Russia, Britain, Ukraine, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, India, Yemen, Egypt and Kenya.66 Some of them are able to obtain
illegal or counterfeit licenses to fish and share the loot with the local warlords in
Somalia.67 France and Spain have based fleets in the Seychelles obtaining twothirds of the year’s tuna catch off Somalia between August and November 2008. 68
About fifty trawlers use Victoria Port, which handles up to 350,000 tonnes of tuna
annually.69 The stocks are falling due to overfishing and no regulations.70 In 2008,
the Somali pirates attacked tuna boats at least three times, successfully obtaining at
least one ransom over $1 million.71 Naturally, their appetites for hunting other
ships have increased.
________________________

57.
Id.
58.
Waldo, Somali Piracy, supra note 38, at 9.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id. at 3.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Waldo, Somali Piracy, supra note 38, at 3.
67.
Id. at 3-4.
68.
Richard Lough, Somali pirates threaten Indian Ocean tuna industry, Reuters Africa, Jan. 22, 2009,
available
at
http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE50L09S20090122?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
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It was brought out at the 2009 Harvard conference, that there was also serious
hazardous waste dumping. This includes industrial, toxic, and nuclear waste
dumping in off-shore and non-shore areas of Somalia.72 In fact, it is so common to
have illegal dumping that there are clips on YouTube showing where some of this
waste has been buried.73 It is believed that the U.N. agencies and organizations
have been fully aware of this crisis but have done nothing either to take positive
action against these criminal activities, or to advise the U.N. Security Council of
this tragedy before passing resolutions 1816, 1815, 1814, 1846, 1838 and 1851 on
sea piracy in 2008.74 There is no mention of any illegal fishing piracy, hazardous
waste dumping, or hostility of foreign vessels toward the Somali fishermen in any
of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions.75 Some of the perpetrators of these illegal dumping acts have been identified, including an Italian firm (Progresso) and a
Swiss firm (Achair Partner).76
Somalia currently has no provisions to deal with potential oil spills or other
marine disasters and has no capability to control her coastal waters and, if necessary, provide sea search or rescue operations.77 It should be noted that Somalia is
recognized as one of the five richest fishing zones of the world and was previously
unexploited.78 It has now been ravaged and poisoned. In addition, the Somali
people receive no income from this fishing resource. While the U.S. State Department is firm in stating that none of the illegal fishing and dumping justified the
actions of the pirates,79 the Somali fishermen pirates believe that they are protecting their fishing grounds.80 They also feel that they are extracting justice and compensation for the marine resources stolen and the ecosystem destroyed by the
IUU.81 As a possible solution to the problems it was pointed out that, first, the
problems of sea piracy and pirate or illegal fishing must be addressed.82 This includes reviewing the national institutional crisis along with the piracy issues.83
Perhaps a joint Somali and U.N. oversight agency could oversee the Somali wa________________________
72.
Waldo, Somali Piracy, supra note 38, at 5. See also, Hari, supra note 36.
73.
See, e.g., People & Power: The Toxic Truth (Al Jazeera English broadcast, Jan. 17, 2009) (available on
Youtube.com in two parts. Part I available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ud1pQ7lGn48; Part II available
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lM7VCIuCXI&NR=1. Part I primarily recounts the murder of two journalists who travelled from Italy to Somalia in order to investigate misuse of Italian aid funds for smuggling illegal
arms and toxic waste into Somalia. The last minute or so of Part I begins showing some video of dumped materials. This video continues in the first several minutes of Part II) (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
74.
Mohamed Abshir Waldo, The Two Piracies in Somalia: Why the World Ignores the Other? 6,
http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalias_twin_sea_piracies_the_global_aramada.pdf (last visited Mar. 21,
2010) [hereinafter, Waldo, The Two Piracies].
75.
Id. at 7.
76.
Jonathan Clayton, Somalia’s secret dumps of toxic waste washed ashore by tsunami, TIMESONLINE,
Mar. 4, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article418665.ece.
77.
Waldo, The Two Piracies, supra note 74, at 7 (quoting Dominic Langenbacher, UNDP Somalia Resident Representative).
78.
Id.
79.
U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Spokesman, Setting the Record Straight: No Justification for Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/dec/133784.htm (last visited Jan.
19, 2010).
80.
Waldo, The Two Piracies, supra note 74, at 9.
81.
Id.
82.
Rotberg, supra note 3, at 5.
83.
Id. at 4-5.
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ters.84 The most important thought was that the problem of piracy will never be
completely eradicated unless there is a restoration of stability on the ground and
there are effective institutions and structures in Somalia that can address the piracy
issue in its totality.85 The actions needed and recommended by in the 2009 Harvard Policy Brief include taking immediate action by the international armada of
navies against the illegal dumping and the illegal fishing in and around the Somali
waters; the revision of Somali fisheries and environmental protection legislation
and institutions; the strengthening of a decentralized governance and legal structures in Somalia; establishment of a regional action plan against IUU fishing and
dumping of toxic or nuclear waste; and, more importantly, a recognition that piracy
must be addressed from the land as well as the sea.86
Having looked at the Somali piracy and the “fishing pirates” of Europe and
elsewhere, and having seen briefly the environment created by dumping various
toxins, nuclear waste, etc., in Somalia, let us now turn to the other side of the coin;
the jurisdictional problems regarding piracy. Much of this topic was touched on in
our prior article which was just recently published; however, certain information
was discussed at the 2009 Harvard conference, which is worth repeating here.
III.

JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS REGARDING SOMALI SEA PIRACY AND
OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL AND PIRATICAL ACTS FROM ELSEWHERE

According to the U.S. Department of State, Somalia’s 637,657 square miles (an
area slightly smaller than Texas) contain 9.8 million people, 2 million of which live
in Somaliland (one of the three provinces in Somalia).87 The per capita gross domestic product in 2008 was US $600.88 The gross domestic product in 2008 was
US $5.524 billion.89 The country is 99.9% Muslim.90 It was suggested that 706
pirates have been encountered by war ships since August 2008.91 Of those, 411
(58%) were caught and released.92 Two hundred sixty-nine pirates were turned
over for prosecution.93 That represents 38% of the total. Two hundred were sent to
Kenya where there have been sixty-nine trials resulting in twenty-three of the pirates being released.94 During this same period forty-two pirate ships were destroyed.95 These numbers suggest that there is a greater problem. It is very diffi________________________

84.
Id. at 5.
85.
Id. at 4.
86.
Id. at 5.
87.
U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Somalia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm (last visited
Jan. 19, 2010).
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
All Things Considered: Examining Impact of Pirate Attacks (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 28, 2009)
(interview with Peter Pham, senior fellow and Africa Project director at the National Committee on American
Foreign Policy), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121982547) [hereinafter Pham interview].
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
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cult to catch the pirates, but the question is who will try them and where will they
be tried. It was brought to our attention that about 1,500 pirates operate off of Somalia at the current time. One of the main problems is that most of the countries
do not want to try these pirates, as this will create greater political problems for
them at home and in the region off the east coast of Africa.
As was shown earlier by the 1932 Harvard Draft, there have always been two
views regarding jurisdiction and sea piracy. The first view would say that pirates
have always been considered enemies of mankind. They could be tried and executed no matter where they were found by any nation that wishes to do so. This
was known as the “Universality principle.”96 A few of us at the 2009 Harvard conference, your authors included, thought the best way to handle both the Somali and
other types of piracy that could arise elsewhere, was to establish a multi-lateral
force as well as an international tribunal to prosecute pirates. This tribunal would
be established by the United Nation as an ad hoc tribunal with the obligation to
address piracy. As can be seen in the Somalia situation, the reality is that States
usually do not want to be delegated this authority to try and prosecute pirates and
to enforce some type of punishment.97
Suggestions were made by a couple of us that perhaps the U.N. could set up or
use the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, established under the 1982
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. This body, located in Hamburg, Germany,98 only has civil authority and apparently does not have the authority to try
pirates.99 However, the Germans, Dutch and Danes have shown no inclination to
try Somali pirates on their shore, either because they do not wish to get involved
because of political ramifications, or they are afraid that the pirates, having such a
low income in Somalia, would probably want to stay in jail as it would be preferable due to the terrible economic conditions at home.
Another thought was that perhaps a treaty could be worked out or possibly the
IMO or the United Nations could set up this type of tribunal that would have authority to try pirates. The location of the tribunal would be problematic as certain
nearby countries, such as the Seychelles, did not express an interest in having such
________________________

96.
While most jurisdictional bases require a direct connection between the prosecuting state and the crime,
“the universality principle assumes that every state has an interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat egregious
offenses that states universally have condemned.” Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 Tex. L.R. 785, 788 (1988).
97.
In fact, several European nations have instructed their navies not to make any arrests of pirates, thereby
avoiding the issue entirely. See Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantanamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting
Pirates and Terrorists 103 (Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009
Harvard Conference, and on file with the authors).
98.
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, General Information – Overview, Seat of the Tribunal,
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Jan 19, 2010) (click link for “General Information,” then “Overview,” then “Seat of the Tribunal”).
99.
“The jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in accordance with [UNCLOS] and all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction
on the Tribunal.” 1982 Convention, Annex VI, Art. 21, supra note 6. In addition, access to the Tribunal is primarily limited to State Parties. Id. at Annex VI, Art. 20. The Tribunal only has jurisdiction over natural or juridical persons as defined elsewhere in UNCLOS. Id. Such jurisdiction is granted only for disputes involving contract interpretation, prospective contractors, or when a State Party sponsors the natural or juridical person and the
UNCLOS Authority incurs liability. 1982 Convention, Art. 187(c)-(e).
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a tribunal.100 There is already a cost-effective one in Kenya trying pirates. The
Kenyan government agreed to the use of their court by virtue of a couple of memos
of understanding (MOUs) between Britain, the United States, the European Union,
and Kenya.101 However, there are problems with this process, which will be
touched on shortly. Apparently, the 1982 UNCLOS has articles on piracy but they
only cover piracy on the high seas between one private vessel and another private
vessel.102 There is also the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA).103 It covers areas and types of
acts not included in the 1982 UNCLOS.104 That treaty has 154 signatures, whose
merchant marines comprise 93.45% of the world’s shipping tonnage.105 One of the
problems with obtaining jurisdiction of pirates is that the Security Council Resolution requires that any actions taken against pirates have to comport with international humanitarian law.106 There are real difficulties in bringing a criminal case
against a foreigner on seas in remote parts of the world.107 For example, evidentiary problems have caused the U.S. Navy to release many pirates at sea in the
wake of the January, 2009, MOU with Kenya.108 A pirate who sees a U.S. war ship
approaching often fears being captured, so he dumps every incriminating piece of
evidence, including all AK-47s and other arms, overboard, so they cannot be used
at trial.109
Another view suggests that there will still be difficulty having nations that wish
to prosecute pirates after looking at the fact that there were 33,000 ships tran-

siting the Gulf of Aden annually, including some 65,000 tankers that carry
seven percent of the world’s oil supply.110 Why? The main reason seems to be

that they are afraid that their fight will look as though white people are grouping up
on people of color—who also happen to be Muslim.111 Denmark, for example,
simply releases the Somali pirates after capturing them.112
________________________

100.
Kontorovich, supra note 97, at 126. The Seychelles have, however, signed a transfer agreement with
Kenya under which pirates convicted in Kenyan courts may serve out their sentences at facilities on the Seychelles. John Ungoed-Thomas & Marie Woolf, Navy Releases Somali Pirates Caught Red-handed, TIMES
ONLINE, Nov. 29, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6936318.ece.
101.
We’ll Not Relent on Piracy War, Kenya to Work with Others to Protect its Tourism Sector, WORLD
SENTINEL, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.worldsentinel.com/articles/view/128580.
102.
1982 Convention, supra note 7, at Art. 101.
103.
27 I.L.M. 668 (1988), available at http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/suppression1988.html.
104.
Unlike UNCLOS, SUA applies to acts in territorial waters, sets out acts which are considered ‘offences’ and allows a State to try an individual in that State’s own courts for those offences. Id. at 674-77.
105.
International Maritime Organization, Summary of Status of Convention as of 31 December 2009,
http://www.imo.org/conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
106.
Kontorovich, supra note 97, at 130.
107.
Id. at 142.
108.
Id.
109.
BBC News Archive, Pirates hit navy ship ‘in error’, BBC NEWS, 7 Oct. 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8294858.stm (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
110.
James Kraska, Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea 198 (Dec. 10,
2009) (manuscript included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference, and on file with
the authors).
111.
Kontorovich, supra note 97, at 145-46.
112.
A pirate gang captured off the Somalian coast last week has been let free, THE COPENHAGEN POST
ONLINE, 24 Sept. 2008, http://www.cphpost.dk/news/1-latest-news/350.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). The
Netherlands recently released pirates after no country, including Kenya and the Seychelles, which both have
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The International Maritime Organization (IMO) consists of 169 member States
and works extensively with non-governmental organizations in the cargo and shipping industry.113 The suggestion has been made that a multi-layered regional approach that includes putting pirates on trial, would work.114 Such a direction was
taken successfully in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore although it was argued
that a tsunami that occurred in the Aceh region of Indonesia had more to do with
the lowering of piracy rates.115 Such a regional approach has resulted in the Nairobi Report, which sought to establish better intelligence gathering including the penetration of piracy groups.116 The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was also created, which met for the first time at the United Nations on
January 14, 2009.117 Twenty-four countries from the EU, NATO, and the African
Union participated in discussions to find a way to create working groups in order to
develop collective action against different aspects (i.e. financial, etc.) of the Somalia piracy.118 The International Trust Fund through the CGPCS was created in order to fund the expenses associated with the prosecution of the suspected pirates.119
Against this background, your authors have been stressing for years the fact
that there has been, and will continue to be, piracy in other parts of the globe. Somalia has been getting a lot of attention, and rightfully so, because of the amount of
piracy and the amount of the ransoms being paid by various companies. There is
no uniform policy on paying ransom. Right now there are approximately 260 hostages who, if ransoms were not paid, could be sold to terrorists. It was suggested
that the best way to keep the government out of this problem would be to let the
companies continue to negotiate ransoms. However, others felt that we should
have a consistent policy in treating responses to ransom demands.
The authors believe that there are other important problems that must be considered when discussing jurisdiction as they will affect, not only the human rights,
but also the environment. For instance, what happens if the pirates decide that they
are tired of taking hostages and seize ships in order to put a dirty bomb on board
and then decide it is easier to negotiate a ransom for the ship without the crew
members? In other words, not all acts of piracy will occur in the high seas. A ship
can be held for ransom in territorial waters. This raises multiple questions. Should
the international community be allowed to attack pirates that are holding the human
race and its environment hostage?120 Should these countries be allowed to attack
agreements with the European Union to help press charges against suspected pirates, would agree to prosecute
them. ‘Somali pirates’ held by Dutch freed, EUBUSINESS.COM, 17 Dec. 2009, http://www.eubusiness.com/newseu/netherlands-somalia.20n (last visited Jan. 24, 2009). England’s Royal Navy has also released pirates “either
because they have not been captured ‘in the act of piracy’ or because of the risk that they would claim asylum if
prosecuted in Europe.” Ungoed-Thomas & Woolf, supra note 100.
113.
International
Maritime
Organization,
About
IMO,
Introduction
to
IMO,
http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=910 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
114.
Kraska, supra note 110, at 203-06 (describing possible precedent for such an approach).
115.
Id.
116.
Id. at 207-09.
117.
Id. at 210.
118.
Id.
119.
Kraska, supra note 110, at 210.
120.
Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 199-200.
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pirates in territorial waters that are about to use a dirty bomb on a ship inside these
waters? What if the coastal State cannot or will not attempt to stop these pirates?
Is an attack on the environment that will destroy human life and the ecosystem not
a crime against mankind? We are seeking to elevate customary law concerning the
environmental and human rights or, to put it another way: “the tendency to “find”
new customary law based mainly on the opinio juris (i.e., statements that a legal
rule has now been recognized) without demonstrating uniform conduct among
states in general is especially evident in regard to human rights, environmental
protection and economic development.”121 The issue is whether this is an “attempt
to put new wine into old bottles legitimized by the felt necessity to extend law to
meet social objectives, when neither treaties nor uniform practice serve that function?”122 In other words, has custom become less important in this time of pervasive change (as Kelson suggests)123 or has its character changed in response to rapidly changing demands? Today some writers refer to “instant custom” or to “custom on demand.”124 Instead of emphasis on uniformities of conduct (the material
element), more importance is accorded to the subjective element of opinio juris,
particularly when declared by states collectively with reasonable expectation of
future conduct conforming to the new principle.125 Henkin comments: “Such efforts to create new customary law by purposeful activity have included . . . resolutions adopted by international organizations . . . to promote, declare or confirm
principles of law by overwhelming majorities or by consensus resolutions which
discourage dissent.”126
For example, at the 2009 Harvard conference, one of the participants discussed
two legislative bills pertaining to piracy that were submitted to the Federal Parliament of Belgium.127 This was a reaction by Belgium to one of their flagged vessels, the Pompei, a stone dumping ship owned by several Belgian dredging companies, being hijacked 100 miles north of the Seychelles.128 Eventually, Belgium
paid the ransom.129 However, Belgium also introduced a couple of legislative bills,
one of which set forth a new definition of piracy as well as a penalty under Belgian
penal law.130 It was pointed out that the definition of piracy in the proposed Belgian legislation differs from Article 101 of UNCLOS.131 First, the bill does not
only punish illegal acts of violence, detention, and any acts of depredation, but also
________________________

121.
LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 96 (4th ed. 1993).
122.
See id. at 95 (citing H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 450-54 (2d ed. R. Tucker 1966)).
Id.
123.
Id. at 95-96.
124.
Id. at 95 (citing H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 450-54 (2d ed. R. Tucker 1966)).
125.
Id. at 96 (citing General course on public international law taught by Louis Henkin at the Hague Academy of International Law in 216 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY 58 (1989)).
126.
Id.
127.
Erik Franckx & Marco Benatar, Operation Atalanta: The European Approach to Fighting Piracy 6-9
(Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference, and on
file with the authors).
128.
Id. at 6.
129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 7.
131.
Id.
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the threat therein.132 Second, whilst Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy as
taking place in the high seas (or a place outside of any State’s jurisdiction), it extends jurisdiction of piracy to other maritime zones to the extent provided for by
international law.133 The proposed law of Belgium adds two instances of aggravating circumstances that may warrant a higher penalty.134 The first is an attack that
endangers navigational safety (e.g., by sailing at night with all lights turned off or
by colliding into another ship during a chase).135 However, “[m]ore novel is the
circumstance of endangering the environment. This could occur when a ship empties its fuel tanks or toxic cargo in an attempt to lighten the ship during a chase.”136
In addition, the bill empowers Belgian warships to prevent and suppress piracy. 137
Specifically, it enables Belgian warships to send military protection teams on board
civilian vessels.138 The bill also stipulates certain rules of engagement.139
The second bill introduced into the Belgium legislature was intended to provide a new basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction for trying pirates in Belgium.140
This would give the Belgian courts and tribunals jurisdiction when piracy is committed against a Belgian ship or when Belgian military personnel apprehend piracy
suspects.141 In both cases there is a link with Belgium.142 Hence, the ground of
jurisdiction is based on the passive personality principle.143 Perhaps the most famous expression of the passive personality principle is Article 14 of the French Civil
Code: “L’étranger pourra être traduit devant les tribunaux de France, pour les obligations par lui contractées en pays étrangers envers des Français.”144 (“A foreigner may be tried before the French courts for obligations contracted in foreign
countries respecting the French.”)145
Those were some of the problems that were discussed regarding sovereignty
and jurisdiction (i.e., who will try the pirates and where will they be tried are issues
that are currently in flux). The next issue is who supplies the pirates with weaponry; and, is there greater influence from terrorists, the mafia(s) or other organizations?

________________________

132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Franckx & Benatar, supra note 127, at 8.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
Franckx & Benatar, supra note 127, at 8.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
Id. The protective principle guards the security of the central interest of the State. The principle “asserts that a state may apply law . . . to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its national where the
victim of the act was its national.”
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
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HOSTAGE TAKING FOR RANSOM AT SEA: THE MONEY VAPOR TRIAL

We know that at least 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden each year. 146
The ransoms paid used to be cheaper.147 It is believed that between US $500,000
and $2 million have been paid per ship.148 However, ransoms continue to increase.
Just recently, owners of a Greek-flagged oil tanker paid $5.5 to $7.0 million U.S.
dollars for release of the ship.149 If only one in 1,000 ships is hijacked (as discussed at the Conference), this would represent approximately $15 million in
2007.150 In 2008, which was a bounty year for the pirates, an estimated $180 million U.S. was paid in ransom money.151 That year, 111 ships were attacked, a
200% increase over 2007.152 Two hundred fourteen ships were attacked in 2009,
nearly doubling the 2008 number.153 The question is “where does this money go to
and how are the pirates supplied?” The following is a chart that was presented at
the Conference answering this question.

________________________

146.
Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 181; About 20 Chinese rescued from pirate attack, CNN, Dec. 17,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/world/africa/12/17/somaliapiracy.
147.
Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 179-80.
148.
Id.
149.
Scott Baldauf, Somali pirates fight over record ransom, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 18,
2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0118/Somali-pirates-fight-over-record-ransom (last visited
Jan. 24, 2010).
150.
Karl Sorenson, Emergence of an Equilibrium in the greater Gulf of Aden? 3 (Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard Conference, and on file with the authors).
151.
Nick Wadhams, Drownings and Lost Ransom Won’t Deter Somali Pirates, TIME, Jan. 12, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1871204,00.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2009). Participants at the
2009 Harvard conference suggested $50 million is a fairer estimate once the lawyers’ fees and agents’ commissions are stripped away. Martin N. Murphy, Piracy as a Land-based problem 4 (Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference, and on file with the authors); see also
Sorenson, supra note 150, at 3.
152.
Mark McDonald, For Somali Pirates, 2009 Is a Record Year, N.Y. TIMES A9, Dec. 30, 2009.
153.
Id.
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“Predictability of Market”
After looking at the chart, one of the issues raised at the 2009 Harvard conference was whether we should say “no” when ransom is requested? It was pointed
out that there are 260 hostages being held, as of this writing, by the pirates. If the
companies did not pay off the ransoms, it is possible that the pirates would sell the
hostages off to terrorists. It was agreed that everybody wants to keep the government out of the ransom game; however, it was also pointed out that the responses
to the pirates have to be consistent. It is important to recognize the international
dimension of Somali piracy – a large proportion of ship ransoms flows out of Somalia.154 In other words, go after the warlords located in Somalia, as well as the
Russian and Italian mafias.155 The U.S. Treasury Department could possibly trace
where funds are coming from and going to. The big problem here, as we discussed
in our prior article, On the Evolution of the Law of International Sea Piracy, is: are
these pirates interacting with terrorists?156 Will terrorists eventually see that these
ransoms could help in their various political causes? Will they eventually become
pirates themselves? It is estimated that pirate attacks are underreported by fifty
________________________

154.
Patrick Lennox, Verbal Treasure Chests and Money Vapor Trails: A Financial Response to Somali
Piracy? 4 (Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference, and on file with the authors).
155.
Rotberg, supra note 3, at 7.
156.
Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 204-05.
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percent so that insurance companies do not raise rates even more than they already
have.
One of the suggestions to limit piracy was to occupy the country from which
the pirates operate.157 An example of the French invasion of Algeria in 1830 was
given as an effective way to root out the notorious Barbary Corsairs;158 however, an
occupation of Puntland (another Somali Province) is not in the international committee’s political agenda.159 As we pointed out in our prior article, the shipping
industry prefers to avoid confrontation with the pirates.160 The reasons for this
behavior are quite clear as ransoms paid to the pirates may equal a few million
dollars, but the actual value of the crew, cargo, and ship is much more.161 It was
brought out that the number of attempted attacks as of the beginning of December
2009, had already surpassed the total that occurred in 2008.162 Successful Somali
hijackings, however, have fallen in number.163 Somali piracy, which previously
concentrated in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast, is now occurring more
frequently in the waters between Somalia and the Seychelles, off the Kenyan coast,
the Red Sea, and as far away as Oman.164 It was also pointed out that Somali piracy is constantly changing.165 Somalis are entrepreneurial, flexible, and adaptive –
their primary goal is making money.166 If the cost becomes too high or the task too
difficult, the Somalis will seek another way to carry on piracy.167
Actually, paying ransoms is the least of the worries that the international community may face. As one participant at the 2009 Harvard conference pointed out,
Somali piracy may become a “Mujahideen at Sea.”168 It was stated that AlShabaab (i.e. “the youth” – a faction in Somalia) spokespersons portray the pirates
as “Mujahideen because they are at war with the Christian countries” defending
“the coast of Allah’s enemies.”169 It is feared that taking the Al-Shabaab’s hint and
ostentatiously fighting for a bigger cause in the shape of a maritime Jihad against
the West would provide the pirates with some sort of “semi-official” sanction.170
They could demand that the Western ships withdraw from the Somali waters; otherwise, they would kill hostages.171 If they view hostages essentially as a commodity and the ransom money dries up, then we may find a situation in which they are
________________________

157.
Sorenson, supra note 150, at 4.
158.
Id.
159.
Id.
160.
Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 192-96; See also, Sorenson, supra note 150, at 6.
161.
Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 179.
162.
McDonald, supra note 152, at A9.
163.
David H. Shinn, The Intensity, Spread and Economics of Somali Piracy 4 (Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript
included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference, and on file with the authors).
164.
Id. at 3.
165.
Id. at 2.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Peter Lehr, Somali Piracy: The Next Iteration 8 (Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript included in materials
distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference, and on file with the authors).
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
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selling the hostages to the highest bidder – Al-Shabaab or another terrorist organization.172
Let us turn to some possible solutions suggested at the 2009 Harvard conference.
V. SOLUTIONS
Most of the attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference agreed that there should
be short and long term solutions discussed as there are eminent problems and problems that may occur in the future. Also, that there are two possible ways to handle
the situation. One emanates from the sea and the other from the land.
A. The sea
One suggestion was a regional-based anti-piracy patrol conducted by Arab
States under the lead of Saudi Arabia.173 The regional approach worked in other
areas of the world, especially the Malacca Strait where the Malacca Strait Patrol
came into existence.174 This was a joint, anti-piracy patrol of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Royal Thai Navy vessels.175 The establishment of this type of patrol has led to a reduction in the severity and overall number of piracy attacks.176
The second possible solution would be establishing an international piracy tribunal.177 The third possibility is attacking the pirates’ land bases but this may lead
to an escalation of force that is used currently.178 The fourth suggestion was the
use of a blockade of the whole coast,179 but as Commander Mike Jager stated after
the recent hijack of the Greek tanker Maran Centaurus: “Patrolling the whole coast
of Somalia is like policing the East Coast of America with five police cars.”180
B. By land
One of the greatest political problems facing the international community is the
lack of governance in Somalia.181 What to do about that country has been a conundrum for nearly two decades.182 Somalia is an example par excellence of a failed
State. The term “failed state” really only applies to part of the country of Somalia.183 Of the estimated nine million Somalis in the world, more than one million of
________________________
172.
Id.
173.
Id. at 2.
174.
Id.
175.
Lehr, supra note 168, at 2.
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
178.
Id. at 5-7.
179.
Id. at 8.
180.
Id.
181.
J. Peter Pham, Response to Ken Menkhaus – Peripheral Vision: A Model Solution for Somalia, 154
THE RUSI JOURNAL 84, Oct. 2009 (as included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference, and on file with the authors).
182.
Id.
183.
Id. at 86.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol14/iss1/4

20

and : Does Wrong Equal Wrong?

Spring 2010

Does Wrong Equal Wrong?

93

them are refugees permanently living in the Diaspora;184 3.5 million live in the Republic of Somaliland;185 and another 2.4 million in Puntland.186 Thus, the temporary federal government (TFG) has control over, at most, less than one-third of the
population, all of whom live in the southern and central Somalia, and about the
same proportion of the former national territory.187 The self-proclaimed “Republic
of Somaliland” and north-western coast of the former Somali State shows what is
possible when a “bottom-up” or “building-block” approach is allowed to take place
instead of imposing the favorite “top-down” strategy for resolving conflicts, consolidating peace and stability within a political space.188 The British Protectorate of
Somaliland gained its independence and became the State of Somaliland on June
26, 1960.189 Less than a week later, it merged with a former Italian colony of Somalia in the south and east.190 The union with Somalia was regretted almost from
the beginning as they faced increasing modernization within both government and
civil society at the hands of a numerically superior seven clansman.191 By the
1980s, full force civil war was underway as Siyad Barre issued measures to suppress the Somali National Movement, which was the primary opposition in Somaliland, and represented the aspirations of the various Isaq clans in particular.192
All of the piracy occurs in Puntland.193 In 1998, tired of being held back by the
constant violence and overall lack of social and political progress in central and
southern Somalia, traditional clan allies of the Darod clan family’s Harti Clan –
including its Dhulbahante, Majeerteen, and Warsangeli sub-groups – meeting in the
town of Garowe, decided to establish an autonomous administration for Puntland
State, Somalia.194 Unlike Somaliland which asserted its independence, Puntland’s
constitution simultaneously supports the notion of a federal Somalia and asserts the
region’s rights to negotiate the terms of any event of national government.195
The aforementioned very brief description of Somalia can be summed up as
basically a stateless or lawless country. Piracy is a crime from the land. Before
any long-term solution can be reached, there must be stability in all of Somalia.
Piracy exploits the anarchy and the wilderness that is the sea but it does so in response to seven factors including, inter alia: 1. opportunity for reward; 2. favorable
geography; 3. permissive political environment; 4. inadequate securities/law enforcement; 5. conflict and disorder; 6. cultural acceptability/maritime tradition;
and, 7. legal and jurisdictional opportunity.196 Historically, pirates have been con________________________
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sidered everything from criminal to fighters for liberty. 197 Their’s might be considered a legitimate way of earning a living.198 Their way might be considered a
normal societal activity.199 For example, the Barbary coast, the Jolo or Sulu pirates
of the Philippines, who used the notorious “pirate wind” to raid communities elsewhere in the region, or the historic Japanese and Chinese pirates mentioned earlier
in this paper.200
VI.

THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

One may ask, “is there any international, or even United States policy, about
dealing with pirates?” The answer that was suggested at the 2009 Harvard conference was “yes!” Fifty-Eight percent of the pirates are released, as we stated earlier, and this is considered a “default” policy.201 There are believed to be 150,000 to
200,000 militia in Somalia. One of the main questions confronting the various
countries who are affected by piracy off of Somalia is “how do you harmonize your
responses?” For now, U.S. responses are inadequate because the United States has
other problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just the sheer size of the areas involved is
discouraging. NATO uses a checklist for what to do when pirates are captured and
where they should be transferred for trial.
Another main problem is the vulnerability of ships today.202 Due to inefficiency, cost-cutting, and the great world recession, there are sub-standard ships being
used.203 Quality ships are not being hijacked.204 They move too quickly (i.e.
around 22 knots).205 The sub-standard ships are referred to as “ships of shame” by
the trade.206 Many ships are idle due to the global financial crisis.207 In addition,
the size and the wages of crews are reduced drastically.208 In addition, flag-ofconvenience states are also at fault because they do not care if their flagged vessels
meet the minimum standards of safety and maintenance.209
In the short term, we are looking at NATO as an interim solution. In the medium term, we are looking at the regional approach as we mentioned earlier in the
paper. In the long term, we are looking and hope to establish law in Somalia and
other places where piracy may erupt.
Other problems include whether or not armed sailors should be placed on
board ships that are sub-standard. The richer ships can do over 20 knots and usual________________________
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ly pirates do not attack ships travelling over 20 knots.210 The argument is that if we
arm sailors, then there may be problems with the sailors killing each other, they
may have inadequate training, or it may lead to an escalation of violence at sea
between the pirates and the ships they seek to hijack.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 2009 Harvard conference discussed all of the aforementioned items. Your
authors are still concerned about piracy occurring in other areas and taking different forms of violence as violence may affect far more than one ship at a time. We
have mentioned the scenario where pirates decide to put a dirty bomb on a ship that
has been hijacked and use that as ransom rather than the hostages. It may be to
their benefit to do this as there will be fewer problems dealing with hostages.
However, the other problem concerns the damage that will be caused to the environment and various ecosystems if pirates decide to hijack a ship and then blow it
up in a very sensitive environmental region. The same is true with human refugees. As we stated in our last article, there may be many millions of refugees due
to a decline in the amount of potable water, and these refugees will certainly be
attacked by pirates who are actually primarily fishermen, as occurred earlier on
during the Vietnamese refugee attacks.
The second item that comes to mind is the fact that we have only been discussing piracy on the high seas. We believe it will be necessary for the regions to allow
ships to go into territorial waters where either the country does not wish to, or is
unable to, go after the pirates. There may not be time for Security Council Resolutions if the pirates intend to blow up the ship or kill many refugees. The Harvard
Draft of 1932 clearly set forth articles permitting hot pursuit into territorial waters
to stop pirates from using the territorial waters of another country as a hiding place.
However, due to reasons of expediency (which was explained in our last article),
the international community decided to adopt the piracy articles set forth in both
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the current UNCLOS 1982.211
If the international community needs long-term solutions it seems to us that an
international tribunal will have to be set up to handle the situation. It will have to
be located in a neutral place, which will not affect any local inhabitants who would
be biased against Muslims or Christians or whoever is involved in the situation.
Perhaps it could go out on “circuit” holding court in different places. In other
words, there are many problems that may occur due to an outgrowth in piracy.
Currently we have the SUA in effect to cover those areas (other than high seas)
where the UNCLOS 1982 does not apply. However, that treaty is not really a solution to anything other than terrorist attacks such as those that occurred on the
Achille Lauro earlier on.
The international community must confront these situations and deal with them
both from the land from which they arise (e.g., Somalia) and from the sea. The
________________________
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main theme of UNCLOS 1982 was the “common heritage of mankind.” Throughout our discussions at the 2009 Harvard conference, it was apparent that all persons
present were interested in preserving civility, even though force might be necessary. We hope that the international community keeps up with the current events
and possibly plans ahead for more scenarios.
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